would come to the fore during periods of meditation and yoga. He found it hard to meditate and do yoga regularly, but tended to go through intensive bouts which he described as "cleansing". At these times his body felt stronger, his mind clearer, and he would then renew his objective to be faithful to his wife, especially in view of the fact that they were planning to have children, given that, as his wife had said to him, "the clock was ticking". The desire to have children was more hers than his, though he felt he went along with it in the hope that becoming a father would help him acquire greater stability.
My own familiarity with meditation had been a deciding factor in him seeking me out. He expressed the hope that therapy would help tighten his "control over unruly behaviour" which meditation and yoga had intermittently initiated. He also anticipated that I could give him advice in terms of meditation techniques. I wanted to honour his aspirations yet felt ambivalent, and told him so. As a therapist, I see my task as separate from that of a meditation facilitator. If someone comes to me for therapy, I respond as a therapist and refrain from being caught up in a dual role. The very notion of a 'Buddhist therapist' or even a 'mindfulness therapist' strikes me as odd. My aspiration is to be present and receptive enough to the therapeutic encounter to allow a meditative quality to be there unaided (and even undetected) for the benefit of the client. Were I to do anything more, it would strike me as prescriptive and even patronising, as a dramatic shift from the delicate responsibility as therapist to the role of 'secular priest' and 'spiritual advisor'.
For these reasons, I did not feel compelled to interfere with Jim's meditation practice (although we did compare notes on a couple of occasions). Instead, I focused on exploring his dilemma with him. I also wanted somehow to honour, in spite of my perplexity in the matter, his aspiration to live a "good life", as he put it, and to become more of a "good guy".
The mutual affection with his wife had taken on brother-sister characteristics. He felt that his relationship with her lacked the intensity and freedom he had experienced during the last of his flings -in his own words "a very passionate, meaningful event ... [which] opened me up to a parallel world ... it made me feel truly alive". At the same time, he had somehow compartmentalized the experience and was not entirely comfortable exploring its fuller meaning for fear that it would "spill over" into his everyday existence and disrupt it. I discussed with my supervisor whether Jim's behaviour could be seen as compulsive and its possible roots traceable in earlier narcissistic damage. Was he consciously or unconsciously choosing to anaesthetise the resulting pain? Jim and I tried to explore in more details the two facets of his life. If anything, his 'wild guy' persona seemed to be endowed with a little more 'soul', human vulnerability and genuineness than the 'good guy' could ever muster. The latter seemed to be strangely contrived and partly governed by a strong need for security and emotional stability. We traced this back to his parents' separation during early adolescence, a time of upheaval and uncertainty.
It emerged that both the 'wild guy' and the 'good guy' were dominant players in Jim's life, yet strangely failing to put him in touch with himself. The challenge was for me to hold up both aspects without implying, suggesting, or moving ahead of his own process. The positive outcome was that to a certain extent he managed to do the same -holding both aspectsrather than trying to eradicate one and bolster the other. He also began to see meditation as being with the dilemma rather than using it as a prescriptive tool in the service of a preexisting agenda.
I choose this brief outline of my work with Jim because exemplary of clients who practice meditation as a way of exerting control over their emotions and affects in the pursuit of the 'good life'. The depth and breadth of questions raised is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I will outline some of the implications of this search for the good life in relation to mindfulness and meditation.
Mindfulness and 'the Good Life'
There are two ways of understanding eudaimonia, the good life, in the western tradition.
One, going back to Aristotle, interprets it as 'the virtuous life', clearly demarcating virtue from vice, a good deed from a bad one. A good life or a happy life (eudaimonia is often translated as 'happiness') is a virtuous life. An aberrant yet not entirely incongruous development of this perspective is the contemporary belief in 'bio-morality' (Zupancic, 2012; Bazzano, 2013c) . What is bio-morality? Let me answer with the following example.
When still a trainee psychotherapist, I worked for a year as a volunteer in the Renal Unit of a major London hospital and also did a brief stint in Palliative Care. I remember it to this day as one of the most challenging jobs I've ever done. The greatest difficulty was not dealing with my general sense of inadequacy in the face of great distress, but the patients' deeplyheld belief that their plight was due to having done something wrong. I can still hear my placement supervisor's mantra: "Bad things can happen to good people". was a mere assortment of erroneous impressions, projections, and biases. This man or woman sitting opposite me and speaking to me right now is surely the real person'. The above conclusion sounds true enough, yet nowadays I feel less certain as I realize that several things are going on at the same time in perception and communication. The majority of these are not registered by the conscious mind. It would seem that more subtle, unconscious communication takes place unheeded.
Mindfulness and double-entry book-keeping
To conceive of individual liberation (or at least of greater freedom from distress) within a socio-political context that is far from liberated only reinforces the notion of the individual as an isolated body-mind unit. It confirms a misleading notion of meditation practice as personal salvation. What is more, by attempting to sever the indissoluble link between individual and societal malaise, it corroborates the view of contemplative practices as opiates, as ways to divert one's attention from historical and political contingencies in order to pursue a path of private deliverance. It also de-contextualizes meditation: for centuries Buddhist meditation has been practised communally, embedded as it was in a cultural and religious milieu. There is a Kierkegaard for every Hegel, an Adorno for every Heidegger and so forth. What's more, each extensive system of thought has its own inbuilt demise: this is one of the meanings of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction (Derrida, 1974 (Derrida, , 1978 . It would be a naive philosophy indeed that unquestionably believed in its own solidity and consistency.
I am not for a moment claiming that Europe is the privileged locus of such way of philosophizing. The very notion of 'Europe' is spurious: not only Europe has deep roots in the East and the Middle East (Said, 1979) , but the flowering of European culture is itself the product of exiles (Adorno, 2005; Bazzano, 2006 Bazzano, , 2012a , rather than the straightforward expression of an imaginary European identity. Moreover, much of European thought has been revitalized over the last few decades in America whilst arguably stagnating and fossilizing in European academia. A question some writers ask (Hartman, 1982; Vendler, 1988) is whether a restricted canon may engender narrow-minded views. They ask whether being disconnected from the distant past or, as Wallace Stevens says, (Vendler, 1988) 
